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It will be noted that of the five justices who voted for conviction
in the Olmstead case, three were no longer members of the Supreme
Court when the Nardone case was decided; and that the other two voted
for conviction in the latter case. Only one of the four dissenting justices
in the former case is no longer a member, and the remaining justices
voted against conviction in the principal case. The justices who have
since been appointed also voted against conviction in the principal case.
The court now seems definitely committed to the proposition that evi-
dence secured by the wire tapping of Federal agents is inadmissible in
the Federal courts, but the policy of the doctrine seems questionable.
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FIXTURES
PRIORITY OF LIEN-CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT OR CHAT-
TEL MORTGAGE OVER REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
The vendor installed two hot-air furnaces in a dwelling house,
under a conditional sale contract, filed July 16, 1932, in which it was
agreed that the furnaces should remain personal property, and removed
two furnaces then upon the premises. The furnaces were held in place
by their own weight and attached to pipes and ducts already on the
premises. At the time of the installation the realty was mortgaged to
the Central United National Bank of Cleveland, which mortgage the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation paid on or about January 7, 1934,
and took a first mortgage of the realty without actual notice of the
conditional sale. In an action between the assignee of the contract and
the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the Court of Appeals held that
the furnaces were a part of the realty, and that the mortgagee of the
realty had a superior right to the furnaces. Twentieth Century Heating
& Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corporation, 56 Ohio App.
188, IO N.E. (2d) 229, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 56, 8 Ohio Ops. 237
(1937).
In order to determine the rights of a conditional vendor or chattel
mortgagee and a mortgagee of the land it must first be ascertained
whether the property covered by the agreement has lost its character as
personalty and become a part of the realty. That, for so much as
remains personal property, the vendor or chattel mortgagee has priority
over the real estate mortgagee. See: Chase Manufacturing Co. v. Gar-
yen, 45 Ohio St. 289, 13 N.E. 493, 90 D.R. 501 (1887); Keeler v.
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Keeler, 31 N.J. Eq. 181 (1879); Pierce v. George, 1o8 Mass. 78,
1i Am. Rep. 31o (1871). Courts, in considering whether a chattel
has become a fixture, name one or more of the following tests: (I)
mode of annexation, (2) appropriation or adaptation to the use of the
realty, (3) the intention of the party making the annexation. This
latter is an objective intention to be inferred from the nature of the
article, the mode of attachment, the situation of the party making the
annexation, and the purpose for which the annexation has been made.
i Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd Ed., p. 905; Teaff v. Hewitt, i Ohio
St. 511, 59 Am. Dec. 634 (1853). While a few cases hold that a
hot-air furnace is not a fixture, Rahway Savings Institution v. Irving
Street Baptist Church, 36 N.J. Eq. 61 (1882); Towne v. Fiske, 127
Mass. 125, 34 Am. Rep. 353 (1879), other cases, supported by the
better reasons, find that it has become a part of the realty, because the
furnace is essential to the use of the premises, and that it was annexed
as a permanent improvement. Stockwell v. Campbell, 39 Conn. 362,
12 Am. Rep. 393 (1872); Theilman v. Carr, 75 III. 385 (1874);
Fuller-TVarren Co. v. Harter, 110 Wis. 8o, 85 N.W. 698, 53 L.R.A.
603, 84 Am. St. Rep. 867 (191o); Lenoir Land Co. v. Haynes Heat-
ing Co., 166 Tenn. 494, 63 S.W. (2d) 659 (1933). Although a
chattel put upon realty has all the characteristics of a fixture, it will
remain personalty, at least between the vendor and vendee, where it
has been placed upon the premises under a chattel mortgage, conditional
sale or other contract in which title is retained by the vendor. Broaddus
v. Smith, 121 Ala. 335, 26 So. 34, 77 Am. St. Rep. 61 (1899);
Hewitt v. General Electric Co., 164 Ill. 420, 45 N.E. 725 (1896).
However, courts are not in accord as to the effect this agreement has
upon the rights of real estate mortgagees.
If the contest, in the principal case, had been between the plaintiff
and the prior mortgagee, in the majority of jurisdictions, the plaintiff's
right of removal would have been valid. i Jones on Mortgages, 8th
Ed., p. 71o; Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Sylvester, 65 Co1. 569, 179
Pac. 154, 13 A.L.R. 441, and note 448 (1919). Ohio has followed
the rule that a chattel placed upon property under a chattel mortgage or
conditional sale retains its character of personalty as against a prior
mortgage on the real estate. Hine v. Morris, 7 Ohio D.R. 482, 3 Bull.
515 (D.C. 1878); Gallett Rulli Co. v. Parish Brothers Co., 8 Ohio
L. Abs. 702 (Ohio App. 1930); East Ohio Bld'g & Loan Co. v.
Holland Furnace Co., 48 Ohio App. 545, 194 N.E. 598, 2 Ohio Ops.
127, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 217 (1934). However, the real mortgagee has
priority where the fixture has become an integral part of the realty, or,
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where removal would cause material damage to the freehold or a sub-
stantial diminution of the mortgagee's original security. Concrete Silo
Co. v. Warstler, 50 Ohio App. 334, 198 N.E. 189, 2 Ohio Ops. 204,
19 Ohio L. Abs. 161 (935); Detroit Steel Cooperage Co. v. Sister-
ville Brewing Co., 233 U.S. 712, 34 Sup. Ct. 753, 58 L. ed. i166
(19'4); Dauch v. Ginsberg, 214 Cal. 54o, 6 Pac. (2d) 952 (1931)-
Courts state as reasons for protecting the chattel mortgagee or condi-
tional vendor that the prior mortgagee has advanced nothing on the
faith that such annexation would be made, and, where the chattel was
sold under a conditional sale contract, that the mortgagor never ac-
quired title; therefore, the mortgagee could not. Binkley v. Forkner,
117 Ind. 176, 19 N.E. 753, 3 L.R.A. 3 (1888); Wurlitzer Co. v.
Cohen, 156 Md. 368, 144 Ad. 641 (1929). A few states have fol-
lowed the so-called Massachusetts rule that the prior real estate mortga-
gee's rights are superior to those of the conditional vendor or chattel
mortgagee. After the execution of the real estate mortgage it is not
within the power of the mortgagor, by agreement with any third per-
son, to deprive the mortgagee of articles affixed to the premises. Clary v.
Owen, 8I Mass. 522 (186o); Greene v. Lampert, 274 Mass. 386,
174 N.E. 669 (193); Gaunt v. llen Lane Co., 128 Me. 41, 145
Ad. 255, 73 A.L.R. 738, and note 748 (1929).
Where a fixture replaces another, which was a part of the realty
when the real estate mortgage was executed, some courts have held
that the conditional vendor or chattel mortgagee nb longer has a right
to remove the article. Bass Foundry & Machine Works v. Gallentine,
99 Ind. 525 (1885). Ordinarily this makes no difference, but the
rights of the parties on account of the removal of the old fixtures will
be equitably adjusted. Bromich v. Burkholder, 98 Kan. 261, 158 Pac.
63, L.R.A. I 9 i6F 1275 (1916); Omaha Loan & Building iss'n. v.
Bigelow-Neb.--, 274 N.W. 574 (1937)-
A chattel mortgage, conditional sale contract or other agreement,
which stipulates that an article remain personalty, is valid against a sub-
sequent mortgagee of the realty who has notice of the same. Simons v.
Pierce, 16 Ohio St. 215 (1865); Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97
Mass. 279 (1867); Haven v. Emery, 33 N.H. 66 (1856). But, in
most jurisdictions, the subsequent mortgagee of the realty, without actual
or constructive notice of the conditional sale contract or chattel mort-
gage, is not bound by the agreement. i Jones on Mortgages, 8th Ed.,
p. 713; Brennan v. Whitaker, 15 Ohio St. 446 (1864); Case Manu-
facturing Co. v. Garven, supra. The vendor consents, at least impliedly,
to the annexation, which justifies the mortgagee's relying on the fixture
248
for security. Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt. 546 (I870). A few courts
have protected the conditional vendor against the subsequent real estate
mortgagee, who had no notice of the agreement. Baldwin v. Young,
47 La. Ann. 1466, 17 So. 883 (1895); Zddams Machine Co. v. Inter-
state Bld'g. & Loan.ss'n., i19 Ala. 97, 24 So. 857 (1898). In the
latter case the court said that the subsequent mortgagee owes a "duty of
inquiring and ascertaining for himself, as must every purchaser of
chattels, the tide of the vendor or mortgagor."
According to the weight of authority, filing or recording of a chattel
mortgage or conditional sale contract is not constructive notice to the
subsequent mortgagee of the realty to which the fixture is annexed.
Brennan v. Whitaker, supra; Case Manufacturing Co. v. Garven,
supra; Brunswick-Balke Collender Co. v. Franzke-Schiffman Realty
Co., 211 Wis. 659, 248 N.W. 178 (1933). Courts have pointed out
that it is the policy of the law that instruments relating to real estate
should appear in real estate records, and that the prospective mortgagee
of the realty cannot be expected to search records relating to personal
property. Phillips v. Newsome, 179 S.W. 1123 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925); Tibbetts v. Home, 65 N.H. 242, 23 Atl. 145, 15 L.R.A. 56
(1889). However, in a number of jurisdictions, filing or recording of
the chattel mortgage or conditional sale is constructive notice. In re
Iltlantic Beach Corp., 244 Fed. 828 (D.C. Fla. 1917); Liddell Co. v.
Cork, 120 S.C. 481, 113 S.E. 327, 23 A.L.R. 8oo, and note 8o5
(1922); Sword v. Low, 122 Ill. 487, 13 N.E. 826 (1887). Where
this rule is followed failure to record or improper recording gives the
subsequent mortgagee priority to fixtures over the chattel mortgagee or
conditional vendor. Continental Gin Co. v. Sims, 103 Okla. 191, 229
Pac. 818 (1934); Cunningham v. Cureton, 96 Ga. 489, 23 S.E. 420
(1894). In the states where recording of the chattel mortgage or con-
ditional sale is constructive notice, and where the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act has been adopted (Alaska; Arizona; Delaware; Indiana;
New Jersey; New York; Pennsylvania; South Dakota; West Virginia;
Wisconsin, 2 U.L.A. Supp. Pg. VII the subsequent mortgagee's right to
fixtures is superior, if removal would cause material injury to the free-
hold. Lasch v. Columbus Heating & Ventilating Co., 174 Ga. 618,
163 S.E. 486 (1932); Lumtkin v. Holland Furnace Co., ix8 N.J.
Eq. 313, 178 Atl. 788 (1935). The Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
2 U.L.A. Sec. 7, P. 12, provides that the conditional vendor, in order
to have a right to fixtures against the subsequent mortgagee of the
realty, must file the contract in the office where a deed of the realty
would be recorded or registered. Excluding the states where this act or
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a similar statute is in force, or where filing or recording of the chattel
mortgage or conditional sale contract is constructive notice, in the major-
ity of jurisdictions, the only methods suggested for protecting the vendor
of personal property, that will be affixed to realty, are to take a real
estate mortgage of the property, properly recorded, Brennan v. Whit-
aker, supra; Tibbets v. Horne, supra, or to perfect a lien upon it under
the Mechanics' Lien Law. Garven v. Hogue & Donaldson, 14 W. L.
Bull 175 (Ohio C.C. 1885).
Although a mechanic's lien would afford protection for the erecting
of fixtures upon property, it would not create a lien upon the separate
articles for the purchase price. Ohio G.C. 831o. The suggestion in the
Ohio cases, Brennan v. Whitaker, supra; Garven v. Hogue & David-
son, supra, of perfecting a lien upon fixtures by a real estate mortgage,
while affording security to the vendor against a subsequent mortgagee,
is, in effect, precluding the use of conditional sale contracts of articles
affixed to the realty. In the writer's opinion, there is a real need for
legislation similar to Section 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
2 U.L.A. 12, providing constructive notice to subsequent mortgagees
or purchasers, by filing the contract in the office of the records of realty.
With such a statute, in case of doubt whether the property, as affixed, is
a chattel or fixture, the vendor could file two contracts, just as he can




LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS FOR UNEMPLOY-
MENT INSURANCE
With the enactment of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act
(Ohio Gen. Code 1345-1-1345-35), the municipalities of this state
have been faced with a perplexing situation. The Act, in providing for
exemptions, has defined the term employment as not including "service
performed in the employ of any governmental unit, municipal or public
corporation, political subdivision, or instrumentality of the United States
or of one or more states or political subdivisions in the exercise of purely
governmental functions." In thus dealing with the government em-
ployee Ohio has adopted an unique course; the other states have in all
instances framed their statutes so as to give complete exemption to
